THERE is little doubt that Islamic State is here to stay as a headache in the Middle East. The only question is how serious a headache for local and foreign powers it will be by mid-2017. Even under the best-case scenario, its clandestine cells will remain active in eastern and northern Syria and in the Sunni areas of Iraq, writes World Review expert, Professor Amatzia Baram.
Islamic State (IS, or Daesh, as it is known in Arabic) may also remain capable of mounting or inspiring small-scale terrorist operations in Europe and the United States through 2017. It will remain a force in social media, even if its appeal may diminish as the territorial “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq loses ground. Other Daesh franchises in Africa, Sinai and elsewhere can be expected to stay in business.
How effective the movement and its franchises will be a year from now will depend largely on decisions made by governments in the West, Russia and the Middle East. The longer Islamic State controls vast territories, the more it will feed Islamic-inspired terrorist activities. It has already outstripped al-Qaeda in its ability to shape the policies of the Western powers and, even more, Russia’s.
This influence will continue and perhaps even intensify in the next year or two. Under the most optimistic scenario, Islamic State’s public profile will begin to wane by early next year. The more pessimistic forecast sees Daesh being rolled back, but in slow motion, leaving behind sleeper cells among the Sunni population.
Some Muslims will remain susceptible to jihadist calls to arms in IS social media or those linked to other radical groups, such as al-Qaeda. The more terrorist acts are reported, the greater likelihood of further “copycat” attacks. Even with Daesh and al-Qaeda on the decline, these operations will continue or even intensify.
It is highly unlikely that U.S. President Barack Obama or his counterparts in the NATO countries will be ready to commit a large ground force to northern Iraq and Syria. This will hold true even if another attack occurs in the U.S. like the recent one in San Bernardino, California, or if Europe experiences more Paris-style massacres.
Mr. Obama cannot afford to destroy his legacy as the president who brought American troops home from Iraq and Afghanistan. At most, he can send a few thousand extra special forces personnel to add to the roughly 3,500 U.S. troops already in Iraq.
The European members of NATO will be no less accommodating to Russia and will follow Washington’s lead in any case. Despite tough talk, even France has shown it is unable and unwilling to send more than a token force to the Middle East. This attitude will not change until the next U.S. president takes office in early 2017.
Moscow is also highly unlikely to dispatch many more troops to Syria. Public opinion in Russia has swung behind the intervention, with support ranging from 60 percent to 70 percent in recent polls. This will probably remain the case so long as there are no meaningful Russian casualties. But Afghanistan remains a very painful memory for ordinary Russians, something President Vladimir Putin is deeply aware of.
Oddly, Moscow betrays little animosity toward Daesh, even though it took responsibility for the October bombing of a Russian airliner over Sinai that killed 224 people. The main thrust of Kremlin’s military operations is directed against the Syrian-led Sunni opposition, especially the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front. Russians have less reason to bomb Daesh, since the mainly Iraqi-led organization is not seen as such a staunch enemy of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, their ally in the region.
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Publication Date:
Thu, 2016-01-14 06:00
