AS ISLAMIC State begins to lose ground in Syria and Iraq, regional and global powers are trying to carve out their own spheres of influence. The struggle is less military than political, and will hinge on negotiations to establish workable solutions, federal and otherwise, in both countries. But managing the endgame over the next 12-18 months will be tricky, and eradicating the spirit that Daesh represents close to impossible, writes World Review expert Professor Amatzia Baram.
One of the successes of Islamic State (IS, or Daesh, as it is known in Arabic) in 2015 was its “annexation” of terrorist organizations in Libya, the Sinai Peninsula, Somalia and Nigeria. Nevertheless, its core remains in Iraq and Syria. Loss of this base would be a stunning blow to Daesh.
Similarly, the killing of Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi would weaken Islamic State but not lead to its collapse. As shown by the death in 2006 of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, such operations can be effective not because the leaders are irreplaceable, but because they demonstrate that the organization has been deeply penetrated, sowing mistrust and confusion.
The Iraqi government will be unable to recruit enough Sunni tribal units to conduct a vigorous offensive against Islamic State. Military operations will continue, but at a slow pace, due to the low morale of Iraqi regulars and the inexperience of the Shia militias. After Ramadi’s “liberation” in late December, the next targets will be Fallujah, just 40 miles from Baghdad, and Mosul, the country’s third largest city. Then will come the rest of the Euphrates Valley.
But Baghdad is in no hurry to go there. The last two months of the Ramadi campaign showed the amazing inferiority of Iraqi forces in the field. During that operation, no more than 500 IS fighters tied down an Iraqi force of at least 10,000, lavishly equipped with heavy weapons and backed with U.S. air-to-ground support. Daesh is currently holding the one million residents of Mosul hostage with a force estimated at 2,000-5,000. Without doubt, IS has learned and applied the lessons of Gaza, where Hamas has been able to operate against Israeli incursions by hiding behind the civilian population.
Also, one can expect Shia-Kurdish tensions to flare up. Without a comprehensive settlement between the Kurds and Baghdad, the borders of the Kurdish regional government (KRG) will be fought over, especially the hotly contested city of Kirkuk. The U.S. will be caught in the crossfire between its two allies in Iraq.
In Syria, too, the best that can be expected in 2016 are limited, local cease-fires. Some rebels will agree to sit at the negotiating table with representatives of President Bashar al-Assad, while others will refuse. Even if the United Nations Security Council agrees to a reduced role for Mr. Assad in the interim period leading up to elections, Iran will insist on him staying in charge. Tehran will work for his electoral victory, while Saudi Arabia and Turkey will demand his immediate departure.
Under such circumstances, no comprehensive cease-fire or political negotiations can take place. The civil war will wind down as all sides become exhausted and lose faith in their ability to make further territorial gains. The Assad regime’s sponsors – Russia and Iran – will be reluctant to commit large ground forces. NATO will continue its air strikes targeting Islamic State. Their primary effect will be to erode the economy of Daesh-occupied territories and force it to yield more ground. Nevertheless, by mid-2017, the organization will still have a meaningful foothold in Syria; it will also hang on to its African and other franchises, along with much of its appeal in social media.
For a more in-depth look at this subject with scenarios looking to future outcomes, go to our sister site: Geopolitical Information Service. Sign in for 3 Free Reports or Subscribe.
Publication Date:
Fri, 2016-01-15 06:00
