AFTER the deadly terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, French President Francois Hollande was quick to announce that his new centrepiece policy would be a ‘security pact,’ which will take priority over the European ‘stability pact.’ On first indications, the strategy’s prospects of success look bleak, writes World Review expert Dr Emmanuel Martin.
The anti-terrorist measures are not the first to be introduced in France this year. They come on the heels of sweeping surveillance powers given to the intelligence services after the January 11, 2015 attacks on the Charlie Hebdo magazine and a kosher grocery store in Paris. The new, repressive framework did not prevent the much deadlier November 13 assault, in which 130 people died.
France’s response was to announce a state of emergency, dramatically increasing police powers. Many abuses have already been reported. Because surveillance, searches, detentions and limitations on movement and mass gatherings can be imposed without authorisation by a judge, there is concern that the rule of law could suffer.
The pre-2015 legal framework already gave the French authorities ample power to deal with terrorists in a context of judicial supervision. Most of the participants in the terrorist attacks had already been tracked by the security services or had prior criminal records. This suggests the difficulty lay in organisation, resources and execution – issues that emergency measures will not necessarily solve.
There is no doubt that the judicial system needs strengthening. For all its lavish public spending, France only spends about half as much on its courts as the United Kingdom does. Young criminals become habitual offenders without ever receiving a significant sentence. A ‘broken window’ policy that cracks down on petty crime might prevent some of these individuals from evolving into radicals and potential recruits for terrorist organisations. It is also imperative to monitor and prevent indoctrination in radical jihadism behind prison walls.
Any attempt at long-term prevention will obviously have to do something about the banlieues, the low-income suburban housing projects where many French Muslims and foreign immigrants live. But economic empowerment of these areas would require a relaxation of business regulations and a veritable revolution on the labour market. This is an unrealistic scenario under France’s traditional politics. Instead, subsidies will probably keep pouring into these areas without addressing the underlying structural issues.
The question that emerged after 11/13 was whether French intelligence had failed. Of course, it is not easy to keep an eye on more than 10,000 radical jihadists. The threat is pervasive, difficult to follow and to anticipate. Individuals can be followed for several years, but if they keep quiet, active surveillance will be dropped as new priorities emerge.
However, there have been policy mistakes. One of the greatest occurred in 2008, under President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012), when France’s two interior security agencies – the Territorial Surveillance Directorate (DST) and the General Intelligence Directorate (RG) – were consolidated.
The new entity, the Central Directorate of Interior Intelligence (DCRI), was the product of a necessary effort at rationalisation. Unfortunately, its culture was dominated by the Cold War ethos of the DST, which focused on counterespionage rather than counterterrorism.
The RG, by contrast, had a beat cop’s knowledge of what was happening on street corners and in neighbourhoods. This part of the operation was downsized and outsourced to the already underfunded police force as a result of the merger. In consequence, a lot of valuable experience and expertise was lost.
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Publication Date:
Tue, 2015-12-22 06:00
